Congress, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied information and excluded from the decision-making process. The confusion, deception, and privatization which marked the Iran-Contra Affair were the inevitable products of an attempt to avoid accountability. Air Force's foreign military sales, said 'where there is a quid, there is a quo.'. And Secord, who had once been in charge of the U.S. McFarlane testified that 'any responsible official has an obligation to acknowledge that every country in the world will see benefit to itself by ingratiating itself to the United States.” North, in fact, proposed rewarding aĬentral American country with foreign assistance funds for facilitating arms shipments Such solicitations, when done secretly and without Congressional authorization, create a risk that the foreign country will expect and demand something in return. Rejected by Congress is dangerous and improper. The solicitation of foreign funds by an Administration to pursue foreign policy goals Activities normally conducted by the professional intelligence services - which are accountable to Congress - were turned over to Secord and Hakim. Funds denied by Congress were obtained by the Administration from thirdĬountries and private citizens. The NSC staff turned to private parties and third countries to do the Government's business. Congress was never informed of the Iran or the Contra covert actions, notwithstanding the requirement in the law that Congress be notified of all covert actions in a 'timely fashion.'. North's testimony demonstrates that he also lied to members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney General, and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC. North admitted that he and other officials lied repeatedly to Congress and to the American people about the Contra covert action and Iran arms sales, and that he altered and destroyed official documents. The Iran-Contra Affair was characterized by pervasive dishonesty and inordinate secrecy. There was confusion and disarray at the highest levels of Government. ![]() The record of the Iran-Contra Affair also shows a seriously flawed policymaking process. The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign policies - a public one and a secret one. The Administration's departure from democratic processes created the conditions for policy failure, and led to contradictions which undermined the credibility of the United States. They testified that they even withheld key facts from the President. When exposure was threatened, they destroyed official documents and lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in Congress. They told neither the Secretary of State, the Congress nor theĪmerican people of their actions. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what “The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception, andĭisdain for the law. ![]() The Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair was released on November 18, 1987.īelow are excerpts of the Executive Summary's “findings and conclusions”: Home » The Hearings » The Majority Report The Majority Report
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |